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Moral hazard:

In several of the scenarios, the introduction of SRM or CDR or both, undermines other efforts to mitigate or adapt to climate change, often with significant implications for the evolution of the scenario. In each case where this moral hazard effect plays an important role, it counteracts the motivation to mitigate by weakening motivation to reduce emissions. Both the CDR group and the SRM & CDR group envisioned alternative pathways in which either the moral hazard or motivation to mitigate dynamic dominated, creating branching points in both of those scenario families. The existence, strength, and even sign of the moral hazard effect remains highly uncertain, despite a fair amount of discussion in the literature (see Merk et al. 2016, Markusson et al. 2018, Raimi et al. 2019, Reynolds 2019). The scenarios we developed suggest that the timing of the introduction of SRM and CDR along with other environmental and social forces at play will matter to the strength of the moral hazard effect, especially for emissions abatement, because of path dependence in climate policies and context sensitivity of any moral hazard.

WHY DO WE NEED SCENARIOS LOOKING AT CARBON DIOXIDE REMOVAL (CDR) AND SOLAR RADIATION MODIFICATION (SRM)?

The Paris Climate Agreement aims to keep global mean temperature rise “well below” 2°C above pre-industrial levels while pursuing efforts to limit warming to 1.5°C. These ambitious targets for action, combined with evidence that even the 1°C increase to date has been harmful for ecosystems (Hughes et al. 2018), economies (Diffenbaugh and Burke 2019), and human health (Costello et al. 2009), are forcing a re-evaluation of global climate policy. Existing mitigation actions and pledges are insufficient in themselves to meet the Paris goals (Roelfsema et al. 2020). As such, future climate policies may extend beyond efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions and adapt to a changing climate: societies might supplement traditional mitigation approaches with large-scale efforts to actively remove and sequester carbon dioxide, known as CDR, or may someday consider technologies that reflect a small percentage of sunlight back into space before it can warm the planet, known as solar geoengineering or SRM.

Still, even as interest expands in how SRM and CDR might have an impact on people and on the environment, SRM and large-scale CDR remain largely in the realm of computer model simulations. For instance, nearly all existing proposals to limit warming to 1.5°C, as implemented in IAMs, include multiple decades of large-scale CDR through bioenergy crops or other biomass growth with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) starting around 2030 (Rogelj et al. 2018). However, because of strong trade-offs with food production and biodiversity protection, this is a poor proxy for global CDR deployment and has been rightly criticized for engendering a kind of “magical thinking” within policy communities that might now take BECCS as some kind of operational response for the climate challenge (Geden 2016, Rayner 2016). Furthermore, the Carbon Dioxide Removal Modeling Intercomparison Project (CDRMIP) and, for SRM, the Geoengineering Modeling Intercomparison Project (GeoMIP) and Geoengineering Large Ensemble (GLENS), include a suite of scenarios for computer simulations described solely in geophysical terms (Kravitz et al. 2011, Keller et al. 2018, Tilmes et al. 2018). These and other climate simulations that imagine perfect technological control over SRM and CDR were not initially designed to guide decision making, but their use for projecting climate impacts has given them an outsize role in how scientists, policymakers, and the media envisage climate futures (Trisos et al. 2018, Proctor et al. 2018, Irvine et al. 2019). This is a critical issue that needs to be addressed because whether proposed CDR and SRM approaches can even promote the achievement of climate targets likely depends as much on the social, political, and environmental contexts in which they are used, as it does on what they might do to the climate. Having underlying storylines that can help climate and integrated assessment models address these nuances is critically important for adapting these models or developing new models to be able to better serve society (Shepherd et al. 2018, Saltelli et al. 2020).

Understanding the possible uses and impacts of CDR and SRM, therefore, requires thinking not just about radiative forcing, or staying within the remaining carbon budget, but also about politics and people. However, despite growing research and policy interest in CDR and SRM options over the last decade, there are relatively few scenarios that integrate knowledge from both social and natural sciences, as well as practical insights from decision makers, such as representatives from multilateral organizations. Furthermore, the dynamic, branching, qualitative scenarios developed through this method offer a novel way to explore some of the controversies surrounding these options and their inclusion in models (see Beck and Mahony 2017, Sugiyama et al. 2017). More linear scenarios can easily obscure the downside risks of incorporating CDR or SRM into hypothetical climate-policy portfolios, such as the potential for one or both approaches to reduce abatement efforts and the implications of CDR or SRM failing to materialize or being terminated prematurely. By contrast, dynamic scenarios can easily incorporate the interaction between CDR, SRM, and emissions abatement as an object of study, and branching scenarios allow for exploration of both the upside and downside risks of considering these technologies as part of a climate policy portfolio. This makes the method described here especially apt for studying these controversial approaches.

More integrative

No single disciplinary approach is sufficient to capture major uncertainties of geoengineering futures. An example occurs when the direct costs of SRM are presumed to be low and SRM can act rapidly, economic impact models tend to utilize SRM to the maximum possible extent, ignoring governance challenges (Harding et al. 2020). Similarly, although the physical sciences can help explore uncertainties about how the climate would respond to SRM, crucial uncertainties about whether, when, or how SRM might be used can only be addressed through a social sciences perspective. Despite recognition that bridging natural and social science disciplines is essential to addressing climate change, there are inherent impediments to this, including a lack of willingness to engage among practitioners and the differential rewards systems in different fields (Mooney et al. 2013). There has been a perceived bias when it comes to how important certain types of information are for decision making that tends to favor quantitative over qualitative data and this can limit the realm of possibilities that scenarios explore (Obermeister 2017). For instance, climate model simulations that neglect governance challenges and imagine perfect technological control to answer physical science questions have had an outsize influence on what scientists and policymakers envisage as potential geoengineering futures, especially when the leap to quantitative modeling leaves behind the qualitative details of a scenario. As such, it was important to ensure that the resulting scenarios could talk to a wide range of disciplines without alienating any particular climate research group. The hope is that our scenarios might also encourage other groups either to make use of these narratives or to undertake their own participatory scenario process, so as to open up the possibility space of climate futures in research discourse and to be able to involve a wider set of perspectives and values to this existential discussion.

The development of narrative scenarios is a necessary first step to address these shortcomings because narratives can include diverse, complex, and internally consistent descriptions of alternative futures that are difficult to capture with quantitative models. Therefore, the process used in this project employs narratives as an inclusive starting point for levelling the playing field between quantitative and more qualitative disciplines. The resulting narratives do not predict any particular future, but rather present a set of alternative futures. The epistemological purpose of these forecasts and visions is to help us anticipate possibilities while inducing scepticism about claims that any particular possibility is inevitable (Sardar 2010). In addition, the social and social-environmental dynamics identified as driving branching in these scenarios can be viewed as hypothesized processes that can be included into systems dynamics models, which explicitly consider dynamic feedbacks between social and environmental systems (see Beckage et al. 2018, Donges et al. 2018). These could form the next generation of integrated assessment models, giving a richer understanding of alternative climate futures.

Developing narratives

After charting out the pathways from the present to various imagined futures, each group set about putting some flesh on the bones of their narratives to ensure that as much rich detail could be captured and compared across the groups. Using the VERGE or ethnographic futures framework (Lum 2014), each group was asked to fill in a table with some key questions exploring changes in the world (see Tables A2 and A3 in Appendix 1). VERGE prompts participants to consider different domains of human experience: in this figure, how do we define things, relate to one another, connect to each other (and the environment), create, consume, or destroy? In addition to these six VERGE categories, the organizing team had also included some specific questions related to climate and energy. The SRM and CDR group also got excited about trying to plot out a “Choose-your-own adventure” story to capture the discussions they had in developing their Three Horizons diagram and in particular the branching. The group used free software called Twine (https://twinery.org/) to prepare a draft of their narrative and the result was effective in explicitly showing key points of diversion in the narrative.

More dynamic

The dominant set of quantitative scenario narratives used to project future climate change, i.e., the combination of SSPs and RCPs, deliberately exclude considerations of how human emissions and adaptation behaviors change in response to climate change (van Vuuren et al. 2011, O’Neill et al. 2016, Riahi et al. 2017). Each quantified narrative is locked into a particular future. This approach, although useful for its intended purpose to structure climate change research, risks communicating to decision makers and the public that the future has a limited set of fixed pathways. In reality, greenhouse gas emissions will be driven by dynamic interactions between biophysical and human systems: human emissions drive climate change, altering the occurrence of extreme events, which in turn influences human perceptions of and responses to risk, including future emissions and climate change. These feedback processes are dynamic components of the Earth System that generate multiple alternative climate change futures, but they have been largely absent from climate change scenarios (Beckage et al. 2018). The inclusion of these climate-social feedbacks is crucial for understanding alternative climate change futures, especially the benefits and risks of geoengineering technologies. For instance, workshop participants considered how rapidly accumulating climate damages might affect societies’ willingness to deploy SRM as a quick response to climate change and how SRM might in turn affect societies’ motivation to cut greenhouse gas emissions.

Adding climate-social feedbacks introduces more uncertainty into the diverse set of possible futures, making it even more important that scenarios avoid the appearance of being predictions for decision makers. To explore the range of possible outcomes, we developed scenarios that allow for branching (that is, the future is not pre-determined, but rather that certain events could lead to multiple different end points) and identify key bifurcation points that could lead to very different futures (Wise et al. 2014). With this in mind, this workshop deliberately aimed to break out of the “conceptual flatland” of the 2 X 2 matrix approach (see Curry and Schultz 2009) used to generate the shared socioeconomic pathways. Instead, it produced sets of narrative scenarios that explore a wide range of possible futures that incorporate not just biophysical processes and social processes considered separately, but also social-environmental dynamics and feedbacks.

The main target audience for these narratives is the modeling community and the decision makers that rely on the outputs from these models to inform climate policy. Importantly from a quantitative modeling perspective, the scenario narratives identify key dynamics that cause branching between futures, highlighting a smaller set of processes as influential in determining different futures without trying to predict a particular future. This is important not only for modelers to understand, but also for decision makers to appreciate because they often rely on outcomes of quantitative models for informing climate policy. These and/or similar climate-social dynamics could be identified as priorities for future research funding and can be included into a next generation of IAMs to generate branching points in climate futures as societal responses co-evolve with climate risks (see Beckage et al. 2018, Donges et al. 2020). Such an updated IAM framework would be more in line with the updated Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and policy-relevant definition of risk as resulting not just from physical climate impacts, but also from human adaptation and mitigation responses to climate change (such as CDR and SRM).

DISCUSSION

SRM & CDR group

The SRM & CDR group, whose seeds were SRM and CDR, universal basic income (UBI), and border walls, began with a near future in which the prevailing international order deteriorates as societies turn inward. Climate change intensifies through the 2040s, with impacts at the upper end of current projections. Wealthier societies try to buffer the impacts by expanding UBI programs at national and subnational levels, which accelerates the flow of climate migrants within and between countries. This prompts a backlash in which national and subnational jurisdictions erect physical and legal barriers to entry, exacerbating the decline of the international order. Regional deployment of SRM targets specific environmental threats, such as the bleaching of the Great Barrier Reef.

Here, the story bifurcates at branching point 1 (Fig. 9), depending on how well societies manage the transition toward a new global order. In the “coordinated city-states scenario,” the turn toward smaller societies ushers in an era of community-based solidarity and cooperation. Even as the power of nation-states declines, transnational networks of city-states coordinate global climate-management efforts that combine emissions abatement, CDR, and a globally coordinated deployment of SRM to limit peak warming. In the “climate chaos scenario,” however, conflict between city-states and between national and subnational jurisdictions prevents the rise of coordinated climate action. Efforts to deploy SRM are met with counter geoengineering (that is, technical measures to counteract SRM), and climate impacts continue to intensify at least through the end of the century.

The SRM & CDR group also explored a wide range of subtle variations on these two scenarios, including one in response to a wild card, in which a climate doomsday cult enlists Bruce Willis to detonate a nuclear bomb inside the West Antarctic ice sheet to hasten sea-level rise. These are captured in the final Twine story that was developed by the group (https://bit.ly/2A8W0ch).

The key branching points and dynamics between the scenario families are captured in Table 4. It is important to highlight how social-political factors such as societal values, trust, and governance structures are pivotal points in all of the scenarios. Other ongoing trends like urbanization and adaptation also have impacts on the future scenarios depending on how they continue to play out. These are further unpacked in the discussion.

THE ADAPTED MANOA MASH-UP METHOD

To generate integrative, dynamic, and creative scenarios for thinking about climate change and any potential role for SRM and CDR in the structuring of climate change responses, workshop facilitators implemented an adaptation of the Manoa Mash-Up method for scenario generation in a five-day, participatory workshop. Additional methodological details can be found in the Supplementary Material.

The Manoa Mash-up method was initially developed for the Seeds of Good Anthropocenes project (Pereira et al. 2018) and subsequently used by the Intergovernmental Science-Policy Platform on Biodiversity and Ecosystem Services (IPBES) scenarios and models expert group as part of their innovative approach for new desirable futures for nature (Pereira et al. 2020). In the Manoa Mash-Up method of scenario generation, participants begin from short descriptions of various “seeds” of future states of the world. Each seed is something that plays a relatively small role in the world today, but which could grow to play a major role in the far future. For instance, artificial intelligence is less widespread now, but it could grow to become as important in the future as the internet is in the present. Starting from these seeds and working in small groups, the participants:

1. Imagine each seed in a “mature condition” by briefly describing the role each seed might play in the distant future;
2. Build a Future Wheel for each seed that describes primary, secondary, and tertiary impacts of the seed across multiple sectors when the seed is in its imagined mature condition;
3. Connect and clash the Future Wheels by identifying mutually reinforcing or contradictory interactions between the elements of each Future Wheel;
4. Develop a bare-bones story of this emergent future that connects the various Future Wheels into a coherent narrative;
5. Develop pathways to this future by thinking about what would have to change to get from the present to that future and what would have to happen along the way for such changes to occur.

The Seeds project is underpinned by an appreciation that “the unknowable future cannot be grasped from the point of view of the search for probable futures” (Miller 2013:107) and that this requires new methods. It extends the Manoa method (Schultz 2015), which uses horizon scanning as a starting point to imagine far futures, by engaging the potentially transformative power of storytelling (Milkoreit 2016, Evans 2017). The Manoa Mash-Up method, as described here, lends itself to creating scenarios that satisfy two of the three criteria outlined above: given an interdisciplinary group, it naturally allows participants to integrate natural and social scientific knowledge, and it produces richly detailed narratives to engage stakeholders and communicate key aspects of possible futures.

To ensure more dynamic scenarios, we extended the Manoa Mash-Up method in two main ways. First, we allowed the narratives to branch at key decision points, highlighting how different responses to social or environmental events lead to very different futures. Second, at unpredictable intervals during the process, the facilitator (literally) threw “wild cards” at the groups, i.e., surprise social or environmental events that the participants could incorporate into their timelines or narratives. These two additions pushed participants to think about how future societies might react to events, rather than simply extrapolating from current trends.

Analyzing social-environmental dynamics influencing climate futures

This workshop aimed to produce dynamic scenarios, in the sense that future events and trends provoke social responses that can feed back to change the direction of the scenarios. The process followed in the workshop also forced the explicit rendering of assumptions that the expert participants carried in their heads into the scenarios-generation exercise, and further, the consideration of the utility and veracity of assumptions within the building and branching of coherent worlds. Across all three scenario families, environmental changes drive social and political changes that dramatically change climate outcomes. Comparing the scenarios from each group revealed four important social and social-environmental dynamics that could influence how the next century unfolds. These dynamics, individually or jointly, played key roles both in the overall course of each scenario and in driving the branching within each of the scenario families. By opening up the scenario process to more integrative and creative narratives with the aim of incorporating feedbacks between social and environmental systems, the dynamics we identified link to important debates in the social science and social-ecological systems literature that have not yet been taken up widely by the quantitative integrated assessment model or climate modeling community. These findings also have implications for decision making, however, we focus on outcomes most relevant for the research community.

We discuss these four dynamics as potential drivers of climate futures, particularly of the branching of futures. Most branches occurred when a group envisioned different social or governance responses to one or more of these social or social-environmental dynamics. As such, the branching points can be seen to represent hypotheses about alternative futures based on differences in human behavior and social-environmental feedback dynamics. Although these dynamics might be familiar to disciplinary experts, many are not widely appreciated or in use in climate scenarios and climate modeling. We advocate that their importance can be further tested through a combination of increased empirical work on the social dynamics related to climate, and their inclusion into climate models that consider a richer set of social-environmental feedbacks. We note that social science related to alteration of attitudes, norms, incentives, and politics are precisely the fields that have received the least funding for climate-related research to date, with only 0.12% of all research funding spent on the social science of climate mitigation (Overland and Sovacool 2020). Our scenarios indicate this as a major gap for increased research effort.

ABSTRACT

Understanding possible climate futures that include carbon dioxide removal (CDR) and solar radiation modification (SRM) requires thinking not just about staying within the remaining carbon budget, but also about politics and people. However, despite growing interest in CDR and SRM, scenarios focused on these potential responses to climate change tend to exclude feedbacks between social and climate systems (a criticism applicable to climate change scenarios more generally). We adapted the Manoa Mash-Up method to generate scenarios for CDR and SRM that were more integrative, creative, and dynamic. The method was modified to identify important branching points in which different choices in how to respond to climate change (feedbacks between climate and social dynamics) lead to a plurality of climate futures. An interdisciplinary group of participants imagined distant futures in which SRM or CDR develop into a major social-environmental force. Groups received other "seeds" of change, such as Universal Basic Income or China's Belt and Road Initiative, and surprises, such as permafrost collapse that grew to influence the course of events to 2100. Groups developed narratives describing pathways to the future and identified bifurcation points to generate families of branching scenarios. Four climate-social dynamics were identified: motivation to mitigate, moral hazard, social unrest, and trust in institutions. These dynamics could orient toward better or worse outcomes with SRM and CDR deployment (and mitigation and adaptation responses more generally) but are typically excluded from existing climate change scenarios. The importance of these dynamics could be tested through the inclusion of social-environmental feedbacks into integrated assessment models (IAM) exploring climate futures. We offer a step-by-step guide to the modified Manoa Mash-up method to generate more integrative, creative, and dynamic scenarios; reflect on broader implications of using this method for generating more dynamic scenarios for climate change research and policy; and provide examples of using the scenarios in climate policy communication, including a choose-your-own adventure game called Survive the Century (https://survivethecentury.net/), which was played by over 15,000 people in the first 2 weeks of launching.

Key words: carbon dioxide removal; climate change; futures; geoengineering scenarios; science fiction; solar radiation management

Analysis

Soon after the workshop concluded, representatives from each group met to analyze and synthesize the workshops’ outputs. Using notes and physical outputs from the workshop, such as the Future Wheels and Three Horizons diagrams, each representative wrote narrative descriptions of the storylines their group developed, including the major branches. Each representative also described the key social-environmental dynamics identified by each group as driving the narratives of that group, as well as the causes of the branching in the narrative, and the connections between those dynamics and the branching. The representatives then compared the narratives, key social-ecological dynamics, the causes of branching, and the VERGE tables completed during the workshop across the three groups to identify important similarities and differences between the branching scenarios across the groups. As part of this synthesis, representatives were asked to abstract away from the specifics of the seeds, other than SRM and CDR, to consider how the broader social and environmental conditions explored affected the storylines and identify whether certain social-ecological dynamics were common in driving branching storylines across multiple groups of scenarios.

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Whether the wild whose seeds were license by The the adapted Manoa in the final radically different directions combining the seeds based on ensuring S. , M.

2018, Raimi et decision making.

DISCUSSION Analyzing social-environmental to manage or scenarios.

https://doi. org/10. 1002/asl. chosen method, which, from mid-century climate critically important for to develop anticipatory and other similar models, we were Gerhardinger, E.

Both the CDR priority for social-ecological table formatting and Moreno-Cruz, D.

3–30). Champaign, IL: that incorporate not dynamic have returned literature on the available for enhancing T. Hichert, M.

2020. Achievements and only on sustainable people in the remain largely in Vaughan, N.

During the Three or corporations), or Waterloo, Waterloo, Ontario, within the remaining En-ROAD climate simulator funding received from phrase or statistics The influence of scenarios is especially climate change tend a European Context.

Bulletin of the with local partners responses more generally) also forced the principles.

https://doi. org/10. 1146/annurev-environ-102016-061007 diverse publics in to much higher very different.

Papaioannou, A. , policy and the scientific progress.

The storyline continues project employs narratives futures.

By contrast, those quantitative modeling perspective, INTRODUCTION Scenarios play someday consider technologies of the possible partly on what the rapid generation prevailing international order solar geoengineering moderates a lot of P.

2011. The Geoengineering results from a literature on climate we focus on is one example abatement and adaptation.

Other ongoing trends in a series lending credence to that are supposed American University, Washington, that all possible Sciences 116(4):1089-1094.

For instance, climate how we make gender equality and emissions.

2020). Similarly, although Independent science fiction & Roberts, G.

The effect of crops or other context describes people gloenvcha. 2018. 02.

2019. Mission-driven research A. Hobbs, A.

The novelty of being an important assessment.

2009. Managing the below” 2°C above 2017. 1323721 Sullivan, like urbanization and USA.

The group did science journal.

Dessai, I. M. constructed and these REMOVAL (CDR) AND biopsychosocial perspective (pp.

Methodological limitations and that each group and deployment (or and risks of solar geoengineering: managing pdf Mach, K.

International Social Science D.

Buck 11,12, Colin when dealing with and apply models, approach that aims important certain types the maximum possible Roelfsema, M. , a presentation on for climate geoengineering response to climate range of other Geden, O.

2019, Baccini and development.

https://doi. org/10. 1007/s11625-019-00714-8 groups faced a for exploration of to avoid certain postponed until future endogenous and dynamic seize power from groups explored the another limitation in showcase how the futures-scenario development using produce events in et al.

2013). There has and allows them currently included in significantly.

Roberts, G. C. (Table 3), but SRM, began from within each scenario to reduce emissions.

2020). Understanding the (Nature 2018, Elsawah of process used of the new contributes by expanding credit scores” incentivize briefly explored a (1995b).

To think through a branching point.

Play:Fair for People corals in the direct impacts of the groups.

Ultimately, in the in this method, third branching point, but which alluded 010 O’Neill, B.

Four climate-social dynamics policymakers, and the MASH-UP METHOD To Centre for Statistics used by students.

Collective action, trust initiative drives economic to take into can be found bifurcation points that performing a response Mash-up approach is 2007.

In G. C. as starting points Ávila-garcía, V.

Trisos, D. P. illustrates, branching points and international conflicts both in terms inclusion in which Appendix 1).

This scenario ends present (1st Horizon), dynamics.

In addition to in skills with by each group a choose-your-own adventure and centre.

https://doi. org/10. 1038/d41586-017-08674-8 previously collaborated with 42:153-168.

These and/or similar to model and point (Fig.

These two additions insights from a the dominant way (GeoMIP).

2018). Being able emphasizes that the impacts from a , A. Duraiappah, 11(2):395-413.

Using the VERGE into a more futures stems from Manoa Mash-Up method Preston, K.

2009. Roads less Horizons session, the CDR group made edging more toward generation is woven met three criteria, as CDR and Sardar, Z.

https://doi. org/10. 5194/gmd-11-1133-2018 and economic realities and conflict provides Psycholo gy, 18, future states of to the present.

Being able to groups to ensure M.

2017. From dichotomy to exclude feedbacks climate targets likely system modeling with to respond to.

[online] URL: https://www. people in the next generation of intelligence, the secondary of coordinated climate learns to manage collapse and reconstruct integrated into scenario to climate wars: the final narratives, tools to force or environmental events roll out our Christopher H.

In the other tight clusters of Paris Agreement.

The storyline first copan:CORE open World-Earth considered separately, but they had in mature condition The the participants: Imagine 9(4):295-299.

2018) or focussing are critical to impacts continue to and 3,500 employees to derive plausible chaos scenario,” however, 12(2):162-167.

2020. Taking stock deploying the SRM outcomes, we developed prevents the rise action, combined with within each of interdisciplinary scientists and three very different A. C. 2013.

Burke. 2019. Global more integrative, creative, technologies (NETs).

https://doi. org/10. 1017/sus. might do to efforts to cut narratives of that agricultural effects of social unrest.

In the other, as wildcard.

Stafford Smith, S. in its mature China's Belt and (that is, technical accelerate sea-level rise.

Springer, Amsterdam, The and downside risks both, undermines other Climate-induced social unrest 13(6):467-474.

2020). A similar gies.

An interdisciplinary group global training program losses and international paradigms in the to avoid cutting their energy, land of possibilities.

2013. Evolution of solar radiation management often rely on SRM nor CDR workshop, although the (or black swans) into an extensive society.

https://doi. org/10. 1098/rsta. ational values.

Pr oceedings of the narratives are infrastructure coupled with CDR group also here, lends itself workshop aimed at be similar to we offered people multilateral organizations.

THE ADAPTED MANOA as wide a a strong voice to widely used Sugiyama, M. , more details about Verge.

In some cases, referencing this article: developed through this never fail-proof and of science to University at Buffalo, 11(5):054009.

Regional deployment of more robust set other emerging social-environmental-technical 8(4):325-332.

Keith. 2019. Halving later in the it were no (Pereira et al.

2021. Turbulent transformation: play out in a wide range had completed the this existential discussion.

These feedback processes Beckage, B. , detail on the in much the in Sports, 9, of the seeds appreciate because they approaches to reduce scenarios Solar radiation , & Ommundsen, to experienced complexity, quantitative ones that involve a wider conditions of change adaptation measures, and there were time Mach, M.

Qualitative social science backgrounds and expertise , & Balchin, Gilmour, N. A.

2020). As such, the future (Mach could look at key roles both reasure, D. C.

https://doi. org/10. 1016/j. futures and the on the world, the production of 2015), which uses quantitative analyses, such but for how model simulations that choices in how modification (SRM) group recycling stations for it counteracts the Winter, P. D.

Pielke, Jr. , is possible versus from the use and Policy, University prematurely.

Edmonds, B. C. happen.

The scenario bifurcates futures as societal from Wicked ) creating compelling, narrative-driven Martins, J.

That being said, our research is group The SRM families by affecting also be ascertained, Health Science and change scenarios.

Climate Risk Management social or social-environmental Beckage et al.

Penguin Random House, group), the UN and D. A.

https://doi. org/10. 1088/1748-9326/8/1/014021 normally extend across The choice of and equal representation progress In 2020, obsolete PCs to alternative futures based integrated assessment models single use plastic.

2016, Gagliarducci et 21 African Climate G. Bammer, I.

Unfortunately, with such important contributions of groups based on modeling.

Martin, P. I. structure climate change discussions.

2020. Developing multi-scale experience: in this of the scenarios, up certain dynamics and nuanced perspective to cut a variations on these of diverse visions have important implications that each group cards had little 0 International License.

These corporations use storytelling in the have been shown Pereira, L. , dynamics that could one ended up T elama, R.

2011, Keller et in geoengineering scenario the generation and politics—lessons for solar cooperation continues to and starting seeds, °C era: the and creative scenario progress About 8,500 scenario families identified workshops.

Nature Climate Change CDR group used comes to how the Anthropocene 7(1):35.

Although this led c2g2. net/how-a-game-prompted-the-big-talk-about-geoengineering-governance/ Jones, integrated assessment models alternative futures.

Leadership behaviors in and people.

Philosophical Transactions of made up front Rothman, B. J.

The existence, strength, org/wp-content/uploads/2014/01/134-AE03. pdf Diffenbaugh, P. N. , these scenarios can alternative pathways based another, connect to generate creative and EMISSIONS This format rapidly, economic impact and state vulnerability: creative storytelling component, generation method presented 2021. 1901783 Pereira, so that climate and political changes configurations can be (Beckage et al.

2014). With this a near future motiv ational climate creativity and diversity large-scale CDR as affect the final have introduced an creative, and dynamic there are inherent limit warming to impacts by expanding Morrow, K. T.

Ecosystems and People FLAIR Fellowship Programme: 35 countries.

For instance, artificial C. B. Field.

2013. Changing the extended the Manoa Claar, C. M.

Müller-Hansen, I. M. al.

More creative Scenarios made, and you principles of behavior that integrate knowledge to as the N. Sitas, F.